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to adduce evidence that these syndromes are much more common 
among Jews than among others. 
There are also errors of omission and commission that under-
mine the book's credibility. In the very first chapter on Brandeis, 
Burt asserts that "Brandeis is the founding father of the Jewish 
presence in American law," a startling claim to anyone familiar 
with the career of Louis Marshall, who not only was self-con-
sciously Jewish, but whose prominence as a lawyer equalled or sur-
passed that of Brandeis.l4 And in the first paragraph dealing with 
Frankfurter, Burt asserts that "for Brandeis their friendship was ap-
parently the most intimate male relationship in his adult life." This 
ignores the lengthy and extremely close ties between Brandeis and 
his brother Alfred, to whom Brandeis wrote nearly every day of his 
life. IS 
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By William Lasser.1 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1988. 
Pp x, 354. $32.95 cloth, $9.95 paper. 
Herbert Hovenkamp2 
Professor William Lasser takes issue with one of the most re-
spectable maxims of constitutional theory: the idea that controver-
sial Supreme Court decisions expend part of the Court's stock of 
political "capital,"3 thereby reducing its authority. The premise of 
this maxim is that the Court is a fragile institution. If it wishes to 
preserve its authority and guarantee maximum compliance with its 
orders, the power of judicial review must be exercised very spar-
ingly. For Alexander Bickel and even more so for Jesse Choper, 
this thesis was a central part of an elaborate argument for judicial 
restraint. "[I]n some principled fashion," Choper concluded, the 
14. SeeM. ROSENSTOCK, LOUIS MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF JEWISH RIGHTS (1965); 
LOUIS MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY (2 vols. C. Rezinkotf ed. 1957). 
15. LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS passim (5 vols. M.l. Urofsky & D.W. Levy eds. 
1971-1978). 
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
3. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 23 (1962); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 156 
(1980); R.G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 229-31 (1960). See a/so]. 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 2-3 
(1962). 
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Court "must ration its power of invalidation."4 
Professor Lasser tries to disprove this theory, largely by point-
ing out that congressional rhetoric denouncing the Court has al-
most never led to practical results, such as curbs on its appellate 
jurisdiction. Lasser argues that "[h]istorical analyses of the Court 
have traditionally underestimated the Supreme Court's power and 
overestimated the Court's vulnerability to damage from the political 
branches." In fact, the "Supreme Court has always been largely 
invulnerable to political assault," unpopular decisions not-
withstanding. 
Lasser supports his point by examining several stormy periods 
in constitutional history: the immediate pre-Civil War slavery de-
bate and the Dred Scott case; the Court's controversial decisions 
involving military power and civil rights during Reconstruction; the 
New Deal Court and the Court-packing crisis; and the radical refor-
mulation of individual rights during the Warren and post-Warren 
(principally Roe v. Wade) eras. From these case studies, he con-
cludes that the Court has consistently been able to make controver-
sial decisions without doing itself damage. Today "a sort of low-
level, permanent crisis has become routine," and unpopular deci-
sions have become an accepted and "unremarkable part of the 
American political landscape." This state of "crisis as usual," how-
ever, "does not seem to have hurt the Court's standing among the 
American people." 
Lasser is right to call for reconsideration of the "fragile institu-
tion" theory. That alone makes this book a valuable contribution to 
constitutional studies. But its thesis is unconvincing, primarily be-
cause Lasser permits Bickel and Choper to formulate the question 
for him. 
The unstated premise of Bickel's and Choper's work was that 
legislation generally has popular support and that the Court, in 
striking it down, is therefore acting contrary to public opinion. A 
more realistic view is that politicians and Justices operate in differ-
ent markets, with different politically optimal outcomes. If legisla-
tion reflects, not the wish of the voting "majority," but rather that 
of effective interest groups, then judicial review may not consume 
the Court's "capital" at all. For example, July 1989 polls reported 
by the New York Times suggest that a majority of Americans basi-
cally favor a woman's right to have an abortion, and that the Web-
ster decision limiting that right is unpopular.s In other words, the 
Court can use up some of its "capital" by upholding a statute, as in 
4. CHOPER, supra note 3, at 156. 
5. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
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Webster. Conversely, the Court may increase its capital when it 
strikes down a statute that most people regard as offensive. Contro-
versial decisions increase the Court's support in some quarters 
while diminishing it in others; the net effect varies from case to case. 
Any general thesis that the Supreme Court uses up capital 
when it exercises judicial review is probably not subject to verifica-
tion, at least in any strict sense. Cause and effect are too difficult to 
discern in such complex political matters. Perhaps the best case for 
the Court's bowing to political pressure is the Roosevelt "Court-
packing" controversy. But even here the evidence is purely circum-
stantial and points in both directions. The Nine Old Men struck 
down New Deal legislation, often by a one-vote margin. We know 
that one Justice, Roberts, changed his mind; but he may have done 
that before the Court-packing plan was even announced. Dean 
Choper cites widespread noncompliance with Brown, Brown II and 
the school prayer and Bible-reading decisions as evidence that the 
Supreme Court depletes its capital when it issues controversial deci-
sions.6 But ultimately the Court won these battles. None of the 
decisions has been overruled, nor has the Constitution been 
amended. Is the Court a weaker or a stronger institution for having 
made these decisions? The evidence is consistent with either 
proposition. 
Lasser's evidence is as inconclusive as Bickel's and Choper's. 
One obvious example of Lasser's failure to isolate important vari-
ables is his study of congressional response to controversial Warren 
and post-Warren era decisions such as Brown and Roe. He notes 
that Republican presidents of this period such as Nixon and Reagan 
have repeatedly criticized the Court for its liberalism, yet Congress 
has never come close to curbing the Court's jurisdiction. But the 
Congresses during this era have been overwhelmingly Democratic. 
Neither Nixon nor Reagan had anything approaching Roosevelt's 
control of Congress in the early 1930s, when one could say that the 
legislative and executive branches were aligned against the Court. 
Lasser cites the failure of the Bark nomination as evidence of the 
Court's endurance in the face of criticism from the political 
branches. But given the almost straight party-line division on Bark, 
it seems clear that the result says little about the Court's ability to 
protect its unpopular decisions in the face of a politically hostile 
Congress. 
The biggest shortcoming in Lasser's book is his uncritical ac-
ceptance of the premise that the political branches speak for the 
majority while the Court-at least when it invalidates statutes-
6. See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 150-55. 
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does not. Lasser's conclusion that the Court can strike down stat-
utes without using up its prestige may well be correct-but not for 
the reasons he suggests. Notwithstanding its oligarchic character, 
the Court may sometimes be closer to the popular mood than a 
legislature. 
Jesse Choper acknowledged the "anti-majoritarian element" in 
the legislative process-but he concluded that its principal effect 
was "to prevent the translation of popular wishes into governing 
rules rather than to produce laws that are contrary to majority sen-
timent."? Statutes are thus presumptively majoritarian. As a gen-
eralization, this may be true. It is hard to say.s But well-organized 
minorities led by skilled lobbyists are notoriously adept at obtaining 
legislation that is not in the public interest and would not necessar-
ily be popular (or enacted) if widely discussed. When it invalidates 
such a statute, the Court, while "anti-majoritarian" in a formal 
sense, may nonetheless be expressing more broadly-based senti-
ments than the legislators did when they enacted it. 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act9 is probably a good example of 
this phenomenon. It permits insurance companies to engage in 
what amounts to price-fixing with no effective supervision by state 
regulatory agencies. A well-organized lobby somehow convinced 
Congress to give its clients such an exemption from the antitrust 
laws. Would the Court be "expending its political capital" if it in-
validated this law? 
The Bickel-Choper paradigm also fails to take account of the 
fact that in our federal system many state and local statutes and 
ordinances, even if locally popular, are contrary to the wishes of 
most Americans. A good example is the Texas death penalty stat-
ute, which permits a state to execute a mentally retarded convicted 
murderer if the defendant cannot pass the state's test for legal in-
sanity, and without permitting the jury to consider retardation as a 
mitigating factor. The Supreme Court recently upheld such a stat-
ute.lo Although the statute may not be "special interest" legislation 
within Texas, it represents the policy of only one state, and may be 
quite contrary to the wishes of most Americans. The Missouri 
abortion restrictions recently upheld in Webster may be another 
example. 
The Bickel-Choper paradigm also needs to be reconsidered in 
7. /d. at 26. 
8. But some appear to believe that much if not most legislation does more harm than 
good. SeeR. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 495-507 (3d ed. 1986). 
9. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1011-1013 (1986). 
10. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
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another fundamental way. The paradigm suggests that politicians 
want to do what most citizens want, and that they as much as the 
citizenry feel injured when the Court strikes down controversial 
statutes, or at least that they are likely to retaliate against the Court 
for offending their constituents. An alternative hypothesis is that 
Congress wants a powerful Supreme Court, even if-perhaps some-
times especially if-the Court makes politically unpopular deci-
sions. The Supreme Court is Congress's lightning rod. The real 
reason Congress is reluctant to whip the Supreme Court in the wake 
of controversial decisions is not that the Court has more power or 
prestige than Congress can control. Quite the contrary. The Court 
shields the members of both Congress and the state legislatures 
from the need to make politically unpopular decisions. Roe v. Wade 
makes it possible for a member of Congress to have it both ways on 
the abortion question. How many congressmen and how many 
state legislators publicly criticize Roe and perhaps in some cases 
even privately believe that it was wrong, but secretly hope that it is 
never overruled? Roe shields them from a great political danger; 
the Republican candidate for Governor of Virginia, among others, 
has cause to wish that Webster had not removed part of that shield. 
On this hypothesis, one would not generally expect to see Con-
gress reducing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the wake of 
a controversial decision. Legislators need a Supreme Court that is 
making controversial decisions so that they themselves do not have 
to make them. In such situations, activism enhances the Court's 
safety even if it decreases its popularity. Whether one applauds or 
deplores this covert alliance between judges and politicians, it un-
doubtedly helps to explain the Court's ability to hand down unpop-
ular decisions. 
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Almost too good to be true: Hustler Magazine v. the Moral 
Majority; Larry Flynt v. Jerry Falwell-two men who offer proof 
that if you go far enough along a social and political spectrum, the 
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